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Abstract:	  This	  report	  synthesizes	  the	  findings	  of	  11	  country	  reports	  on	  policy	  learning	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  labour	  market	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  were	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  is	  funded	  by	   the	   7th	   Framework	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   EU-­‐Commission	   (http://www.inspires-­‐research.eu/).	  Notably,	   this	   report	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  objectives	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  policy	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  processes	  and	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  policy	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  presents	   the	   impacts	  of	  various	   tools	  and	  structures	  of	   the	  policy	   learning	   infrastructure	   for	   the	   actual	   policy	   learning	  process.	   The	   report	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   three	  objectives	  of	  policy	  learning:	  evaluation	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  assessment	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  policy	  effectiveness,	  vision	  building	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  planning,	   and	   consensus	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   In	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   countries	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   tools	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  infrastructure	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  broad	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  public	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  groups	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  private	  sector.	  Finally,	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  four	  recommendations	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   usual	   political	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   policy	   learning	   tools	   and	   infrastructures	  should	  be	  sufficiently	  independent	  from	  political	  influence	  or	  bias.	  Fourth,	  Policy	  learning	  tools	  and	  infrastructures	  should	  balance	  out	  mere	  effectiveness,	  evaluation	  and	  vision	  building.	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Identifying	  best	  practices	   in	   the	   field	  of	  policy	   learning	   in	  an	  objective	  way	   is	  not	  a	  straightforward	  
task.	  Different	  learning	  practices	  or	  tools	  may	  be	  evaluated	  differently	  by	  different	  actors,	  depending	  
on	   their	   policy	   objectives.	   Should	   knowledge	   be	   concentrated	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   governmental	  
department,	   so	  as	   to	  allow	  efficient	  problem-­‐solving	  oriented	  policies?	  Or	   should	   it	  be	  widespread	  
among	   interest	  groups,	  with	  the	  risk	  that	  knowledge	   is	  primarily	  being	  used	  for	  political	   reasons	  of	  
single	  actors?	  Of	  course,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  answer	  these	  questions	  in	  an	  objective,	  scientifically	  valid	  
way.	  	  
	  
As	   a	   result,	   in	   this	   report	   we	   have	   decided	   to	   follow	   a	   rather	   different	   path.	   We	   first	   identify	   a	  
number	  of	  objectives	  that	  may	  be	  pursued	  by	  policy	  learning	  processes	  in	  democratic	  politics.	  These	  
objectives	   have	   been	   identified	   inductively	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   11	   national	   reports	   produced	   in	   the	  
context	  of	  the	  INSPIRES	  project1.	  Policy	  learning	  infrastructures	  are	  then	  assessed	  in	  relation	  to	  how	  
successful	  and/or	  promising	  they	  are	  in	  reaching	  these	  objectives.	  	  
	  
What	   do	  we	  mean	  by	  policy	   learning	   infrastructure?	   The	   idea	  originates	   from	   the	  political	   science	  
literature	  on	  policy	  learning	  which	  uses	  this	  notion	  in	  rather	  broad	  sense.	  We	  rely	  on	  Peter	  Hall’s	  well	  
known	  definition	   of	   policy	   learning	   as	   a	   ‘deliberate	   attempt	   to	   adjust	   the	   goals	   and	   techniques	   of	  
policy	   in	   response	   to	   past	   experience	   and	   new	   information’	   (Hall,	   1993).	   Understood	   in	   this	   way,	  
policy	   learning	  can	  occur	   in	  many	  different	  ways.	  For	  example,	  evaluation	  reports	  may	  show	  that	  a	  
policy	   is	   not	   working	   as	   expected.	   Similarly,	   monitoring	   indicators	   may	   reveal	   that	   some	  
interventions	  are	  not	  delivering	  the	  expected	  results.	  Policy-­‐makers	  may	  react	  to	  this	  knowledge	  and	  
try	  something	  else.	  Alternatively,	  research	  may	  highlight	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  problem,	  of	  which	  
policy-­‐makers	  were	  not	  aware.	  An	  additional	  route	  for	  policy	  learning	  may	  simply	  be	  the	  observation	  
of	  other	  political	  units	  experimenting	  a	  new	  tool	  or	  policy	  that	  seems	  promising.	  Other	  political	  units	  
may	  be	  other	   countries	  or	   sub-­‐units	   in	   federal	   polities.	  Overall,	   one	   can	  argue	   that	  policy	   learning	  
may	   follow	   many	   different	   routes.	   What	   characterizes	   the	   process	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   refers	   to	  
knowledge	   that	   is	  developed	  and/or	  acquired	  and	   that	  has	  some	   impact	  on	  policy-­‐making,	  at	   least	  
potentially.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  INSPIRES	  countries	  are:	  Belgium,	  Germany,	  Greece,	  Italy,	  Hungary,	  the	  Netherlands,	  Slovenia,	  Spain,	  Sweden,	  Switzerland,	  
and	  the	  UK.	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Against	   this	   background,	   the	   notion	   of	   policy	   learning	   infrastructure	   refers	   to	   institutions,	   rules,	  
practices,	  actors	  and	  possible	  other	  structures	  that	  can	  participate	  to	  the	  policy	   learning	  process	   in	  
democratic	   polities.	   For	   example,	   most	   countries	   have	   research	   units	   within	   their	   Ministries	   that	  
oversee	   evaluation	   studies,	  monitor	   relevant	   indicators,	   and	   participate	   to	   policy	   planning	   efforts.	  
Some	  countries	  have	  developed	  dedicated	  outfits	  that	  should	  act	  with	  more	  independence	  from	  the	  
government,	   such	   as	   the	   Dutch	   “Scientific	   council	   for	   government	   policy”	   or	   the	   Swiss	   “Federal	  
expert	  commissions”.	  Outside	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  state,	  political	  parties	  and	  organized	  interests	  are	  also	  
contributors	  to	  the	  policy	  learning	  infrastructure,	  by	  running	  research	  institutes	  or	  foundations.	  This	  
is	  the	  case	  in	  Germany	  or	  in	  the	  UK.	  Finally,	  civil	  society	  actors,	  such	  as	  think	  tanks	  and	  NGOs	  can	  also	  
be	   considered	   as	   part	   of	   the	   policy	  making	   infrastructure,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   they	   produce	   and/or	  
develop	   knowledge	   that	   is	   then	   brought	   to	   public	   attention	   in	   the	   context	   of	   policy	   debates.	   In	  
addition,	   public	   and	   private	   universities	   and	   research	   institutes	   potentially	   contribute	   to	   policy	  
learning	  overall.	  
	  
It	   is	   clear	   that	   in	   a	   democratic	   polity,	   policy	   learning	   processes	   can	   be	   highly	   politicized	   exercises.	  	  
Scientific	   knowledge	   is	   seldom	   neutral	   in	   relation	   to	   political	   and	   economic	   interests.	   As	   a	   result,	  
knowledge	  is	  likely	  to	  become	  a	  weapon	  in	  political	  fights.	  In	  this	  respect,	  dispassionate	  debates	  on	  
problems	   and	   solutions	   based	   on	   a	   common	   understanding	   of	   the	   problem	   and	   on	   an	   agreement	  
with	  regard	  to	  the	  desirable	  outcome	  are	  probably	  the	  exception	  rather	  than	  the	  rule.	  For	  this	  reason,	  
a	  policy	  learning	  infrastructure	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  contested	  terrain.	  One	  qualitative	  element	  
of	   a	   country’s	   policy	   learning	   infrastructure,	   which	   may	   exist	   or	   not,	   are	   sufficient	   checks	   and	  
balances	  as	  well	  as	  trusted	  ‘impartial’	  sources	  of	  factual	  information	  so	  that	  in	  the	  political	  battle	  not	  
‘anything	  goes’.	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  outright	  lies	  have	  a	  chance	  to	  be	  detected	  as	  lies	  and	  if	  the	  political	  
culture	  excludes	  liars	  from	  influencing	  the	  debate,	  then	  the	  battleground	  in	  which	  knowledge	  is	  used	  
as	  weapons	  becomes	  better	  defined.	  
	  
This	   report	   is	   structured	   as	   follows.	   First,	   we	   are	   going	   to	   present	   different	   objectives	   of	   policy	  
learning.	   Secondly,	  we	  are	  going	   to	  outline	   the	  different	   tools	  and	  processes	   in	   the	  policy	   learning	  
infrastructure.	  In	  the	  third	  part	  of	  the	  report,	  we	  will	  present	  possible	  effects	  of	  various	  elements	  of	  
the	  policy	  learning	  infrastructure	  on	  actual	  learning	  practices.	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2.	  Objectives	  of	  policy	  learning	  
The	  national	   reports	  produced	   in	   the	  context	  of	   the	   INSPIRES	  project	  have	  allowed	  us	   to	   identify	  a	  
number	   of	   objectives	   that	  may	   be	   pursued	   by	   policy	   learning	   and	   supported	   by	   a	   policy	   learning	  
infrastructure.	  In	  this	  section,	  we	  report	  on	  the	  most	  important	  ones.	  	  
	  
2.1	  Evaluation	  and	  assessment	  of	  policy	  effectiveness	  
	  
This	   objective	   is	   by	   far	   the	  most	   often	  mentioned	   in	   the	   national	   reports,	   and	   can	   take	   different	  
forms.	  Many	  countries	  have	  audit	  or	  evaluation	  units	  within	  the	  governmental	  machinery	  or	  at	  some	  
distance	  from	  it.	  
	  
Other	  countries	  tend	  to	  outsource	  evaluation	  research	  in	  specific	  policies.	  This	  is	  common	  in	  the	  UK,	  
in	  Switzerland,	   in	  Germany,	   in	  the	  Netherlands	  among	  other	  countries.	   In	  the	  UK,	  systematic	  policy	  
evaluation	  has	  taken	  up	  a	  big	  role,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  might	  obscure	  more	  fundamental	  analysis.	  “…	  
evaluations	  conducted	  by	  the	  [British]	  civil	  service	  (or	  outsourced	  from	  it)	  are	  often	  rather	  limited	  in	  
scope.	  Their	  remits	  tend	  to	  pertain	  to	  the	  efficiency	  or	  effectiveness	  of	  specific	   instruments,	  rather	  
than	  examining	  or	  questioning	  the	  underlying	  rationale	  for	  policy	  decisions.”	   (McEnhill	  et	  al.,	  2015:	  
58).	   In	   the	  Dutch	  case,	   social	  policy	  evaluations	  are	  often	  outsourced	   to	  private	   research	   institutes	  
rather	  than	  to	  universities	  (Aa	  et	  al.,	  2015).	  Nevertheless,	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  noted	  that	  evaluation	  within	  
government	   units	   is	   not	   necessarily	   more	   critical	   or	   broader	   in	   its	   conclusions	   than	   the	   ones	  
produced	  by	  private	  providers.	  To	  the	  contrary,	  university-­‐based	  evaluations	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  result	  
into	  more	  far	  reaching	  conclusions,	  either	  by	  the	  reports	  themselves	  or	  publications	  based	  on	  them.	  
	  
Pilots	   are	   also	   a	   common	   practice	   to	   assess	   and	   evaluate	   policy	   effectiveness.	   Relevant	   policy	  
innovations	   were	   piloted	   before	   being	   rolled	   out	   nationally	   in	   Belgium,	   Germany,	   Spain,	   Sweden,	  
Switzerland,	   and	   the	  UK.	  Other	   countries	   have	   had	   some	   experience	  with	   pilots,	   though	   on	   a	   less	  
general	   scale.	   This	   is	   the	   case	   of	   Hungary,	   and	   Greece.	   The	   Greek	   report	   points	   out	   that	   recent	  
innovations	   were	   virtually	   always	   adopted	   without	   pilots.	   This	   is	   partly	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  
country	  has	  experienced	  a	  state	  of	  permanent	  urgency	   in	  the	  period	  under	  consideration,	  and	  that	  
piloting	   requires	   a	   time	   frame	   that	  was	   incompatible	  with	   the	   country’s	   situation.	  However,	   other	  
factors	  may	  have	  played	  a	  role,	  as	  even	  pilots	  that	  were	  planned	  and	  for	  which	  EU	  funding	  had	  been	  
secured	  were	  not	  carried	  out	  because	  of	  disagreements	  among	  the	  relevant	  national	  institutions2.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  This	  event	  refers	  to	  the	  program	  known	  as	  “Operational	  Program	  for	  the	  Development	  of	  Human	  Resources	  in	  Greece”,	  




While	  piloting	  policies	  may	  seem	  a	  sensible	  approach,	  pilots	  are	  not	  always	  used	  as	  intended.	  In	  the	  
UK,	  the	  NDYP	  pilot	   (New	  deal	   for	  young	  people)	  was	  rolled	  out	  nationally	  before	  the	  results	  of	   the	  
final	   evaluation	   were	   available	   (McEnhill	   et	   al.,	   2015:	   44).	   In	   Germany,	   the	   MoZArT-­‐Pilots	  
(Modellprojekte	   zur	   verbesserten	   Zusammenarbeit	   von	   Arbeits-­‐	   und	   Sozialämtern)	   were	   declared	  
insufficient	  and	  abandoned	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  a	  bigger	  reform	  before	  the	  evaluation	  results	  had	  been	  
made	  available	  (Champion,	  2013).	  	  
	  
The	   last	  observation	   suggests	   that	  pilots	  may	  also	   serve	   related	  objectives	   than	   the	  explicit	  one	  of	  
assessing	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  a	  policy/intervention.	  Consensus	  building,	  or	  buying	  time,	  may	  be	  one	  
of	  them,	  as	  argued	  below.	  	  
	  
Assessment	   of	   policy	   effectiveness	   takes	   also	   place	   in	   a	   broader	   way,	   not	   so	  much	   by	   evaluating	  
individual	  policy	  but	  by	  monitoring	  some	  relevant	   indicators,	  such	  as	  the	   long	  term	  unemployment	  
rate,	  youth	  unemployment,	  etc...	  	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  benchmarking	  of	  a	  country	  against	  other	  ones	  is	  
useful	  process	  to	  identify	  areas	  where	  there	  might	  be	  some	  scope	  for	  improving	  policy	  effectiveness.	  
	  
2.2.	  Vision	  building,	  planning	  
Policy	   learning	   can	   also	   be	  understood	   in	   broader	   terms	   and	   refer	   to	   a	  more	   forward	   looking	   and	  
fundamental	   planning	   function.	   Looking	   beyond	   assessing	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   polices	   and	  
interventions,	   this	   objective	   of	   policy	   learning	   processes	   encompasses	   contributions	   to	   public	  
debates	  on	   the	  overall	   direction	  of	  policy.	   For	  example,	   since	   the	  1990s	  we	  have	  witnessed	   in	   the	  
vast	   majority	   of	   European	   countries,	   a	   reorientation	   of	   social	   and	   labor	   market	   policies	   towards	  
activation,	   i.e.	   policies	   aiming	   at	   putting	   individuals	   back	   into	   jobs	   before	   paying	   benefits	   (Bonoli,	  
2013).	  This	  process	  has	  also	  been	   the	   result	  of	  policy	   learning,	   though	  on	  a	  more	  general	   level.	  Of	  
course,	   like	   all	   human	   activities,	   policy	   learning	   is	   not	   immune	   to	   mechanisms	   of	   emulation	   and	  
fashion	  following.	  These	  mechanisms	  may	  have	  played	  a	  role	  in	  the	  “activation	  turn”	  that	  has	  been	  
taking	  place	  in	  Europe	  over	  the	  last	  twenty	  years	  or	  so.	  
	  
The	  policy	   learning	   infrastructure	  can	  contribute	   to	   this	   function	  objective	  of	  building	  a	  vision,	  and	  
planning	  overall	  orientations	  of	  policy.	  The	  key	  actors	   in	   relation	   to	   this	  objective	   include	  probably	  
less	   government	   departments	   and	  ministries	   and	  more	   political	   outfits,	   and	   academia.	   Envisioning	  
new	  policies	   is	  a	  highly	  political	   task,	  and	   in	   this	   respect	  cannot	  be	  successfully	   carried	  out	  by	  civil	  
servants,	  who	  are	  required	  to	  follow	  the	  directions	  decided	  by	  democratically	  elected	  politicians.	   In	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other	  words,	  civil	  servants	  tend	  to	  operate	  in	  a	  context	  where	  they	  have	  less	  freedom	  and	  capacity	  to	  
operate	  creatively,	  which	  would	  allow	  them	  to	  come	  up	  with	  innovative	  solutions.	  Although	  we	  need	  
to	   note	   that	   the	   clandestine	   fore-­‐runner	   of	   the	  Hartz	   Commission,	   the	  meetings	   organized	   by	   the	  
Bertelsmann	  foundation,	  included	  high-­‐ranking	  civil	  servants	  (Hassel	  and	  Schiller,	  2010).	  
	  
Vision	  building	  can	  as	  a	  result	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  more	  collective	  endeavor,	  to	  which	  many	  diverse	  
actors	  participate,	   including	  political	  parties,	  academia,	  civil	  society,	   the	  social	  partners,	  and	  where	  
government	  officials	  and	  hierarchical	  modes	  of	  governance	  have	  a	  more	  limited	  role.	  Independence	  
from	   government	   is	   sought,	   for	   instance,	   in	   some	   existing	   institutions.	   These	   include	   the	   Dutch	  
Scientific	   council	   of	   government	  policy	   (WRR)	  which	   is	   staffed	  by	   academics,	   or	   the	   Economic	   and	  
Social	  councils	  (or	  committee)	  of	  Spain	  and	  Greece,	  which	  are	  multipartite	  outfits	  where	  the	  state	  is	  
represented	  together	  with	  other	  key	  actors.	  	  
	  
2.3.	  Consensus	  building	  
	  
There	   are	   various	  ways	   in	  which	   policy	   learning	   can	   contribute	   to	   consensus	   building	   processes	   in	  
democratic	  polities.	  Societal	  consensus	  may	  result	  from	  the	  repeated	  production	  of	  a	  given	  piece	  of	  
knowledge,	  by	  actors	  belonging	   to	  different	  political	   camps	  and	  over	   time.	  A	  good	  example	  of	   this	  
process	  is	  the	  notion	  that	  pension	  systems	  need	  to	  be	  reformed	  because	  of	  demographic	  ageing.	  In	  
most	  countries,	  this	  notion	  appears	  in	  the	  public	  debate	  sometime	  in	  the	  1990s,	  usually	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
the	  publication	  of	  demographic	  projections	  showing	  the	  system	  will	  become	  unsustainable.	  Typically,	  
a	   single	   report,	   regardless	  of	   its	  quality,	   is	   insufficient	   to	  generate	  a	   reformist	  dynamics	  capable	  of	  
leading	   to	   actual	   policy	   change.	   In	  most	   cases,	   initial	   attempts	   at	   adapting	   pensions	   to	   an	   ageing	  
society	  are	   fought	  by	  many	  actors,	  who	  dispute	   the	  need	   for	  such	   interventions.	  This	   is	   the	   typical	  
situation	   in	   the	  early	   to	  mid-­‐1990s	   in	   the	   field	  of	  pension	  policy.	   In	   the	   following	   years,	  more	  and	  
more	   knowledge	   is	   generated	   on	   the	   impact	   of	   ageing	   on	   pension	   budgets,	   by	   a	   large	   variety	   of	  
actors,	   including	   governments,	   the	   European	   Union,	   the	   OECD,	   think	   tanks,	   interest	   organizations	  
and	  so	  forth.3	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  opponents	  of	  pension	  reform	  are	  unable	  to	  produce	  evidence	  that	  
population	  ageing	  is	  not	  happening	  or	  that	  it	  will	  not	  impact	  severely	  on	  pension	  budgets.	  As	  a	  result,	  
by	   the	   mid-­‐late	   2000s,	   a	   consensus	   emerges	   in	   most	   countries	   that	   pension	   reforms	   are	   indeed	  
needed,	  and	  they	  are	  more	  easily	  adopted	  (Bonoli,	  2000)	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Private	  insurance	  companies	  are	  part	  of	  this:	  The	  lowering	  of	  German	  state	  pensions	  and	  the	  strengthening	  of	  a	  private	  
complementary	  pillar	  was	  clearly	  influenced	  by	  the	  finance	  lobby.	  If	  the	  state	  had	  the	  money	  to	  subsidize	  Riester	  pensions,	  
it	  could	  have	  used	  the	  same	  money	  to	  stabilize	  the	  pension	  funds.	  However,	  opening	  up	  a	  new	  financial	  market	  was	  a	  goal	  




In	  this	  respect,	  consensus	  building	  requires	  a	  pluralistic	  policy	  learning	  infrastructure,	  where	  actors	  of	  
different	   political	   orientations	   and	   with	   a	   certain	   distance	   from	   the	   state	   can	   contribute	   to	   the	  
process.	  
	  
Consensus	  building	  can	  also	  take	  place	  as	  a	  result	  of	  more	  deliberate	  endeavors.	  	  This	  is	  sometimes	  
the	  case	  with	  ad	  hoc	  commissions	  that	  are	  set	  up	  by	  governments	  with	  a	  view	  to	  elaborate	  reform	  
proposals	  and	  include	  all	  the	  relevant	  interests.	  Sweden	  has	  a	  tradition	  of	  such	  commissions,	  known	  
as	  “inquiry	  commission”,	  which	  are	  typically	  composed	  of	  members	  representing	  employers,	  unions	  
and	   other	   relevant	   interests,	   and	   must	   agree	   on	   some	   reform	   proposals.	   As	   a	   result,	   inquiry	  
commissions	  seem	  particularly	  suited	  to	  develop	  reform	  proposals	  that	  will	  then	  be	  acceptable	  to	  a	  
majority	   of	   relevant	   actors	   once	   they	   reach	   the	   political	   arena.	   In	   Switzerland	   “federal	   expert	  
commissions”	  fulfill	  a	  similar	  function.	  They	  also	  provide	  a	  “testing	  ground”	  for	  policy	  ideas	  that	  are	  
being	  considered	  by	  the	  government	  before	  being	  announced	  to	  the	  general	  public.	  	  
	  
Consensus	  building	   is	  an	   important	   function	  of	   the	  policy	   learning	   infrastructure,	  especially	   in	  veto	  
point	   dense	   polities,	   such	   as	   Switzerland	   or	   Germany	   in	   our	   sample.	   In	   these	   countries,	   a	   broad	  
degree	  of	  consensus	  on	  a	  policy	  is	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  legislate;	  otherwise	  opponents	  can	  make	  use	  of	  
the	  available	  veto	  points	  and	  prevent	  the	  adoption	  of	  unwanted	  legislation	  (Bonoli	  et	  al.,	  2015,	  Trein	  
et	   al.,	   2015).	   Consensus	   building	   is	   also	   important	   in	   countries	   with	   strong	   organized	   interests,	  
particularly	  unions.	  In	  our	  sample,	  this	  is	  the	  case	  in	  Sweden	  and	  Italy.	  In	  these	  countries,	  the	  trade	  
unions	  are	  often	  de	  facto	  veto	  players,	  either	  because	  of	  their	  mobilizing	  capacity	  (Italy)	  or	  because	  
their	   involvement	   in	   policy	   implementation	   (Sweden).	   As	   a	   result,	   their	   approval	   of	   or	   at	   least	  
acquiescence	  to	  government	  policy	  is	  an	  essential	  precondition	  for	  success	  in	  the	  law	  making	  process.	  	  
3.	  Tools,	  processes	  and	  institutions	  
There	  are	  different	  types	  of	  learning	  tools,	  processes	  and	  institutions	  in	  European	  political	  economies.	  
Mainly,	  we	  can	  distinguish	  three	  main	  groups	  of	  elements	  that	  make	  up	  the	  learning	  infrastructure:	  
Public	  bodies,	  expert	  councils,	  as	  well	  as	  partisan,	   interest	  group	  and	  civil	   society	  related	  actors.	   In	  
each	   of	   these	   categories,	   there	   are	   some	   groups	   or	   institutions	   that	   are	   rather	   independent	   from	  
political	   interests,	   whereas	   others	   are	   clearly	   under	   the	   influence	   of	   actors	  with	   a	   strong	   political	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agenda.	  In	  the	  following,	  we	  are	  going	  to	  explain	  the	  different	  categories	  of	  learning	  infrastructures	  
and	  discuss	  the	  independence	  of	  their	  members	  from	  political	  influence.4	  
3.1	  Public	  bodies	  
The	   first	   category	   of	   learning	   infrastructure	   elements	   entails	   public	   bodies.	   Notably,	   these	   are	  
ministries,	   independent	   agencies,	   parliamentary	   groups	   and	   bodies	   as	   well	   as	   subnational	  
governments,	  i.e.	  members	  of	  a	  federation	  or	  municipal	  governments.	  The	  first	  group	  are	  ministries	  
at	  the	  national	   level,	  for	  example	  the	  national	  ministry	  for	   labor.	  According	  to	  the	  national	  reports,	  
ministries	  are	  not	  only	  important	  political	  actors,	  but	  can	  also	  provide	  information	  that	  is	  relevant	  for	  
policy	   learning.	   For	  example,	   in	   Italy,	   the	  national	  ministries	  also	   serve	  as	  experts	   in	   their	   relevant	  
policy	   field,	   for	   example	   the	  ministry	  of	   labor	  provides	   important	   expertise	   regarding	  employment	  
policies.	   In	   Slovenia,	   it	   is	   also	   the	  ministry	   of	   labor	   that	   is	   the	  most	   significant	   expert	   in	   terms	   of	  
expertise	   on	   labor	   market	   issues.	   Another	   example	   is	   Switzerland,	   where	   the	   national	   ministries	  
create	   expertise.	   Moreover,	   under	   the	   umbrella	   of	   the	   ministry	   of	   labor,	   there	   are	   subordinated	  
administrative	  agencies	  that	  create	  knowledge	  relevant	  for	  policy	  learning.	  For	  example,	  the	  national	  
employment	  office	  in	  Hungary.	  These	  agencies	  are	  independent	  units,	  but	  under	  the	  directive	  of	  the	  
national	   ministry.	   Consequently,	   they	   are	   often	   very	   well-­‐funded,	   but	   also	   subject	   to	   political	  
influence	  by	  the	  ministry	  and	  the	  government.	  This	  entails	  that	  the	  national	  ministry	  can	  abolish	  or	  
change	  these	  units	  in	  case	  it	  is	  dissatisfied	  with	  their	  services	  or	  considers	  that	  they	  are	  not	  needed	  
anymore.	  This	  happened	  for	  example	  with	  the	  National	  Labor	  Office	  in	  Hungary,	  which	  was	  abolished	  
in	  2015	  (Lengyel	  et	  al.,	  2015:	  61-­‐62).	  
Amongst	   the	   public	   bodies,	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	   institutions	   that	   are	   charged	   with	   executive	  
functions,	  but	  do	  not	  directly	  report	  to	  the	  government.	  For	  example	  the	  Federal	  Employment	  Office,	  
in	  Germany	   is	   an	   independent	   body	   of	   public	   law	   that	   is	   charged	  with	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	  
national	   unemployment	   insurance.	   One	   of	   its	   tasks	   is	   the	   enquiry	   of	   national	   labor	   market	   data.	  
Although	  it	  is	  formally	  under	  jurisdictional	  oversight	  of	  the	  national	  ministry	  for	  labor,	  it	  acts	  rather	  
independently.	  A	   similar	  example	   is	   the	  Spanish	  public	  employment	  observatory	   (State)	   (Martínez-­‐
Molina	  et	  al.,	  2015:	  34).	  Another	  example	  is	  the	  Lowpay	  commission	  in	  the	  UK.	  It	  is	  an	  advisory	  non-­‐
departmental	   public	   body	   that	   is	   sponsored	  by	   the	  Department	   for	  Business,	   Innovation	   and	   Skills	  
and	   that	   advises	   the	  national	   government	  on	   the	  adaptation	  of	   the	  minimum	  wage.	  Although	   it	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Another	  element	  of	  the	  policy	  learning	  infrastructure	  are	  institutionalized	  surveys	  (panel	  surveys	  or	  repeated	  cross-­‐
sectional	  surveys)	  which	  were	  not	  created	  for	  a	  specific	  purpose	  and	  which	  are	  available	  to	  the	  research	  community	  at	  no	  
or	  little	  cost.	  This	  has	  four	  advantages:	  1.	  The	  questions	  in	  these	  surveys	  were	  not	  constructed	  with	  a	  specific	  political	  
purpose	  in	  mind;	  so	  the	  findings	  should	  be	  less	  biased.	  2.	  You	  have	  not	  only	  a	  snapshot	  but	  a	  long-­‐term	  view.	  3.	  Findings	  
can	  be	  tested	  and	  criticized	  by	  other	  researchers.	  Insofar	  as	  variables	  relevant	  to	  a	  specific	  question	  can	  be	  found	  in	  any	  of	  
these	  surveys,	  answers	  can	  be	  found	  much	  quicker	  and	  at	  much	  lower	  cost	  than	  in	  the	  case	  that	  you	  have	  to	  start	  a	  new	  
survey	  of	  its	  own	  for	  each	  new	  question	  that	  comes	  up.	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under	   the	   umbrella	   of	   a	   governmental	   department,	   it	   is	   relatively	   independent	   from	   political	  
influence.	  In	  Germany,	  the	  IAB	  (Institut	  für	  Arbeitsmarkt-­‐	  und	  Berufsforschung)	  is	  an	  example	  of	  this	  
kind	   of	   organization.	   It	   is	   a	   large	   research	   unit,	  which	   is	   formally	   part	   of	   the	   Federal	   Employment	  
Agency,	  but	  acts	  more	  independently	  than	  the	  agency,	  due	  to	  its	  ties	  with	  the	  academic	  community.	  
Its	  research	  tasks	  go	  far	  beyond	  the	  collection	  of	  administrative	  labour	  market	  data,	  for	  example,	  the	  
IAB	  runs	  several	  important	  national	  surveys	  among	  employers	  and	  the	  population	  (Jansen	  and	  Knuth,	  
2015).	  
	  
A	   second	   group	   of	   public	   bodies	   that	   are	   relevant	   for	   policy	   learning	   are	   parliamentary	   research	  
services	   and	   committees.	   In	   order	   to	   deal	   with	   complex	   and	   complicated	   problems,	   modern	  
parliaments	  work	   in	   committees.	  Usually,	   these	   committees	   comprise	  of	  members	   from	  all	   parties	  
represented	  in	  parliament	  and	  aim	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  proposal	  that	  can	  find	  majority	  in	  the	  national	  
parliament.	   Although	   their	   function	   is	   mainly	   political,	   they	   are	   part	   of	   the	   policy	   learning	  
infrastructure,	   since	   parliamentarians	   familiarize	   themselves	   with	   a	   problem,	   research	   results	   and	  
possible	  solutions.	  Notably,	  the	  British	  and	  the	  Greek	  report	  mentioned	  parliamentary	  committees	  to	  
be	   important	   parts	   of	   the	   policy	   learning	   infrastructure	   in	   their	   countries.	   Another	   way	   of	   how	  
parliamentary	  bodies	  may	   influence	  on	  policy	   learning	   is	  via	  parliamentary	  research	  services.	  Some	  
parliaments,	   such	  as	   the	   federal	  German	  parliament	  have	   scientific	   services,	  which	  all	  members	  of	  
parliament	   can	   use	   in	   order	   to	   request	   information.	   Thereby	   researchers	   are	   collecting	   relevant	  
information	  regarding	  a	  certain	  problem	  and	  inform	  the	  MPs	  about	  the	  ongoing	  debate	  on	  the	  topic	  
as	  well	  as	  possible	  policy	  options.	  Using	  this	  information	  allows	  Members	  of	  Parliament	  to	  learn	  in	  a	  
problem	   solving	  manner.	   However,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   the	   information	   and	   research	   results	   from	   the	  
scientific	  services	  of	  the	  federal	  parliament	  are	  being	  used	  also	  in	  political	  way,	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  
or	   support	   a	   certain	   political	   position.	  What	   is	  more,	   these	   researchers	   do	  mostly	   ‘desk	   research’	  
(including	  juridical	  expertise)	  and	  do	  not	  have	  the	  capacity	  of	  collecting	  original	  empirical	  data.	  
	  
Then,	  there	  is	  another	  group	  of	  public	  bodies	  in	  the	  policy	  learning	  infrastructure	  that	  are	  completely	  
independent	   from	   the	   national	   government.	   These	   are	   above	   all	   the	   central	   banks,	  which	   provide	  
independent	   statistical	   information	   and	   are	   supposed	   to	   act	   according	   to	   economic	   problem	  
pressures	  and	  be	  independent	  from	  political	  influences.	  Independent	  central	  banks	  ought	  to	  update	  
their	  beliefs	  based	  on	  problem	  solving	  approaches	  rather	  than	  political	  agendas.	  Consequently,	  they	  
are	  institutions	  of	  independent	  policy	  learning.	  Technically,	  the	  same	  should	  be	  true	  for	  other	  offices	  
that	  are	  charged	  with	  the	  provision	  of	  information	  or	  the	  supervision	  of	  public	  finances.	  For	  example	  
the	  Swedish	  national	  audit	  office	  is	  charged	  with	  controlling	  government	  finances.	  It	  is	  independent	  
from	   the	   national	   government	   and	   under	   the	   oversight	   of	   the	   national	   parliament.	   Similarly,	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statistical	  offices	  are	  an	  important	  element	  of	  the	  policy	  learning	  infrastructure,	  which	  is	  –	  at	  least	  in	  
theory	  –	  independent	  from	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  national	  government.	  National	  statistical	  offices	  have	  
the	  task	  to	  provide	  accurate	  statistical	   information	  on	  social,	  economic,	  environmental	  etc.	  matters	  
that	  can	  be	  used	  by	  researchers,	  policymakers	  and	  other	  actors	  in	  the	  political	  arena.	  Under	  normal	  
circumstances,	   national	   statistical	   offices	   should	   be	   immune	   to	   political	   interests.	   However,	   it	   can	  
happen	  that	  governments	  attempt	  to	   influence	  the	  work	  and	  the	  data	  output	  of	  national	  statistical	  
offices.	   A	   prominent	   case	   of	   this	   is	   the	  Greek	  National	   Statistical	   Office	   (ELSTAT),	  which	   has	   been	  
subject	  to	  political	  influence	  on	  its	  leadership.	  
	  
Two	   other	   public	   bodies	   of	   the	   policy	   learning	   infrastructure	   are	   subnational	   governments	   and	  
universities.	  Both	  are	  very	  different	  from	  one	  another,	  but	  they	  are	  similar	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  are,	  
to	  a	  certain	  extent,	  rather	  independent	  from	  the	  national	  government.5	  Subnational	  governments	  in	  
federal	   states	   have	   a	   far	   reaching	   autonomy	   from	   the	   national	   government.	   If	   they	   enjoy	  
considerable	  authority	  in	  a	  certain	  policy	  field,	  i.e.	  in	  Switzerland,	  they	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  test	  ground	  for	  
innovative	  policy	   solutions,	  which	   later	   on	  might	   be	   implemented	   in	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   country,	   or	   in	  
other	   constituent	   units	   of	   the	   federation.	   Universities	   are	   independent	   research	   institutions,	   self-­‐
governed,	   but	   publicly	   financed.	   Basically,	   they	   are	   the	  most	   independent	   from	   political	   interests	  
among	  the	  public	  bodies	  of	  the	  policy	  learning	  infrastructure.	  
3.2	  Expert	  councils	  
The	  second	  major	  category	  in	  the	  learning	  infrastructure	  entails	  expert	  councils.	  These	  are	  located	  at	  
the	   intersection	  of	   the	  public	  and	   the	  private	  sphere.	   In	   fact,	   they	  are	  commissions	   that	  are	  either	  
permanent	   or	   not,	   which	   are	   composed	   of	   experts	   on	   a	   certain	   topic.	   However,	   the	  members	   of	  
these	   commissions	   are	   not	   employed	   to	   work	   in	   the	   commission.	   Some	   of	   them	  might	   be	   under	  
public	  employment,	  for	  example	  in	  a	  university,	  whereas	  others	  could	  be	  members	  of	  interest	  groups,	  
i.e.	  unions	  or	  employer	  organizations.	  
	  
Examples	  for	  expert	  councils	  are	  temporary	  commissions,	  which	  have	  been	  created	  with	  the	  purpose	  
to	   find	   solutions	   to	   a	   problem.	   A	   popular	   example	   for	   this	   type	   of	   learning	   infrastructure	   are	   the	  
commissions	   that	  were	  set	  up	  to	  solve	  the	  problem	  that	  has	  been	  caused	  by	  aging	  populations	   for	  
retirement	   funds.	   In	   several	   countries	   expert	   commissions	   dealt	   with	   this	   issue,	   for	   example	   the	  
Rürup	  or	   the	  Herzog	   commissions	   in	  Germany,	   or	   the	   Belgian	   pension	   reform	   commission	   (Jansen	  
and	  Knuth,	  2015,	  Struyven	  and	  Pollet,	  2015:	  11)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Bakker	  Commission	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Of	  course,	  fiscal	  and	  political	  autonomy	  of	  municipalities	  and	  subnational	  governments	  in	  federal	  countries	  vary	  across	  
countries	  (Hueglin	  and	  Fenna,	  2006).	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(Aa	   et	   al.,	   2015:	   39-­‐40).	   These	   commissions	   consisted	   of	   experts	   from	  different	   parties,	   as	  well	   as	  
members	  of	  the	  main	  interest	  groups	  and	  social	  partners.	  The	  goal	  of	  these	  commissions	  is	  twofold.	  
On	  the	  one	  hand,	  they	  aim	  at	  finding	  solutions	  to	  a	  pressing	  problem,	  i.e.	  sustainability	  of	  finances	  of	  
the	  pension	  funds.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  they	  have	  also	  a	  consensus	  finding	  mission,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  
they	  aim	  at	  finding	  solutions	  that	  are	  also	  politically	  feasible	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  all	  main	  stakeholders	  
agree	   to	   them.	   Different	   examples	   for	   these	   commissions	   are	   the	   Swedish	   temporary	   inquiry	  
commission,	  the	  Biagi	  commission	  in	  Italy,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Greek	  ad-­‐hoc	  commissions	  (Papadopoulou	  
et	  al.,	  2015:	  33).	  
	  
Apart	   from	   the	   mentioned	   temporary	   commissions,	   permanent	   expert	   commissions	   play	   an	  
important	  role	  for	  policy	  learning	  in	  many	  countries.	  Examples	  for	  this	  are	  the	  Greek	  Tripartite	  Bodies	  
(OAED	  +	  NILHR),	  which	  assemble	  members	  of	  government	  and	  social	  partners	  in	  order	  to	  deal	  with	  
labor	  market	  problems.	  Another	  example	  is	  the	  Dutch	  Scientific	  Council	  (WRR)	  that	  consists	  of	  5-­‐11	  
professors	   that	   are	   appointed	   and	  do	   research	   that	   is	  mandated	  by	   the	  national	   government.	   The	  
reports	   are	   published,	   i.e.	   reports	   on	   labor	   market	   issues.	   Although	   this	   research	   is	   government	  
financed,	  the	  members	  of	   the	  scientific	  council	   remain	   independent	  professors.	  Other	  countries	  do	  
also	   have	   temporary	   expert	   commissions.	   For	   example,	   Switzerland	   has	   a	   number	   of	   permanent	  
expert	  commissions,	  such	  as	  the	  Federal	  Commission	  on	  Racism	  (EKR)	  or	  the	  Federal	  Commission	  on	  
Immunization	  (EKIF).	  These	  are	  independent,	  but	  permanent	  commissions,	  which	  advise	  government	  
and	  other	  actors	  on	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  certain	  problems,	  based	  on	  expertise.	  In	  the	  domains	  of	  social	  
policy,	  there	  are	  also	  permanent	  councils,	  for	  example	  the	  Spanish	  Youth	  Council,	  which	  deals	  with	  
questions	  regarding	  youth	  unemployment.	  
3.3	  Parties,	  interest	  groups	  and	  the	  private	  sector	  
A	   third	   category	   of	   the	   policy	   learning	   infrastructure	   are	   institutions	   and	   organizations	   that	   are	  
related	  to	  political	  parties,	  interest	  groups	  and	  the	  civil	  society.	  This	  group	  is	  the	  most	  heterogeneous,	  
both	  in	  terms	  of	  varieties	  of	  their	  legal	  status	  as	  well	  as	  regarding	  the	  political	  independence	  of	  the	  
members.	  
	  
To	   begin	  with,	   political	   parties	   can	   be	   an	   important	   part	   of	   the	   policy	   learning	   infrastructure	   in	   a	  
country.	   For	   example,	   in	   Germany,	   all	   the	   main	   political	   parties	   are	   linked	   to	   foundations,	   which	  
finance	   research	   projects	   and	   provide	   stipends	   to	   Ph.D.	   students.	  What	   is	  more,	   they	   provide	   the	  
political	  parties	  with	  information	  regarding	  certain	  policy	  problems	  and	  suggest	  solutions.	  Examples	  
for	  this	  are	  Konrad-­‐Adenauer-­‐Stiftung,	  which	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  CDU,	  or	  the	  Friedrich-­‐Ebert-­‐Stiftung	  that	  
has	   connections	   with	   the	   SPD	   (Jansen	   and	   Knuth,	   2015).	   Similarly	   in	   the	   UK,	   research	   related	   to	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political	  parties	   is	   an	   important	  part	  of	   the	  policy	   learning	   infrastructure.	  However,	  other	   than	   the	  
German	  parties,	  which	  are	  linked	  to	  foundations,	  the	  main	  political	  parties	  in	  Britain	  outsource	  their	  
research	  to	  private	  think	  tanks	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  contracts	  (McEnhill	  et	  al.,	  2015:	  56).	  
	  
In	   addition	   to	   political	   parties,	   interest	   groups	   and	   social	   partners	   do	   also	   run	   their	   own	   research	  
infrastructure.	   For	   example,	   again	   in	   Germany,	   the	   trade	   union	   umbrella	   organization	   is	   closely	  
related	   to	   a	   research	   foundation,	   the	  Hans-­‐Böckler	   Stiftung,	  which	   has	   its	   own	   research	   units	   and	  
commissions	   outside	   research	   on	   social	   and	   labor	  market	   problems.	   Another	   example	   is	   Sweden,	  
where	   the	   national	   employers’	   organization	   provides	   research,	   which	   has	   been	   referred	   to	   by	  
political	  parties	  during	  reform	  processes.	  
	  
Eventually,	   there	   is	   the	   private	   sector	   of	   research	   organizations,	   which	   are	   technically	   completely	  
independent	   from	  public	   influence.	  Nonetheless,	   they	  depend	  on	  demands	  and	  contracts	  by	  public	  
actors.	   These	   organizations	   comprise	   of	   institutes	   that	   are	   independent	   from	   party	   influence,	   for	  
example	   in	   the	   UK	   or	   in	   Belgium.	   An	   example	   from	   Germany	   would	   be	   Bertelsmann	   Foundation.	  
These	  organizations	  are	  either	   for	  profit	  companies	   that	  depend	  on	  contract	   research.	   In	   this	  case,	  
they	  are	  highly	  dependent	  on	  governments	  and	  public	  bodies	  as	  well	  as	  political	  parties,	  which	  might	  
outsource	   their	   research	   demands	   to	   them.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   if	   these	   private	   actors	   are	  
foundations	  having	  their	  own	  funds,	  they	  are	  less	  dependent	  on	  contract	  research.	  Academics	  are	  de	  
facto	  very	  independent,	  however	  this	  independence	  is	  largely	  founded	  on	  ethical	  grounds.	  De	  iure,	  it	  
is	   the	   state,	   i.e.	   national	   or	   subnational	   parliaments	   that	   approve	   university	   funding,	   and	   often	  
governmental	   departments	  have	  a	   say	   in	   the	  occupation	  of	   vacant	  positions.	  However,	   it	   is	   rather	  
unlikely	  that	  they	  interfere	  directly	  into	  the	  research	  agendas.	  	  
4.	  Differences	  and	  impact	  of	  policy	  learning	  infrastructures	  
Following	  the	  mentioned	  tools	  and	  processes	  of	  policy	  learning,	  we	  can	  distinguish	  a	  number	  of	  ways	  
in	  how	  the	  policy	  learning	  infrastructures	  impact	  on	  policy	  learning	  practices.	  Notably,	  we	  found	  four	  
dimensions,	  of	  variation	  regarding	  the	  policy	  learning	  practices	  that	  either	  have	  positive	  or	  negative	  
impacts	  for	  policy	  learning.	  
	  
1. Centralization	  vs.	  pluralism:	  The	  first	  dimension	  opposes	  centralization	  and	  pluralism	  in	  the	  
policy	   learning	   practices.	   Centralized	   learning	   processes	   entail	   that	   the	   learning	  
infrastructure	  concentrates	  policy	  learning	  concerning	  a	  specific	   issue	  around	  a	  very	  limited	  
number	   of	   tools	   and	   processes	   of	   the	   policy-­‐learning	   infrastructure.	   For	   example,	   if	   policy	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learning	  occurs	  around	   the	  national	  ministry	  and	   in	   some	   related	  and	   subordinated	  bodies	  
only,	   without	   taking	   into	   account	   competing	   processes,	   such	   as	   independently	   organized	  
research.	   Another	   example	   for	   centralized	   policy	   learning	   processes	   is	   if	   learning	   is	   only	  
based	  on	   the	  contribution	  of	   research	   that	   is	   related	   to	  a	  partisan	  organization.	  This	   could	  
happen	  for	  example,	  if	  a	  campaigning	  party	  promises	  reforms	  to	  voters,	  and	  once	  in	  power,	  
the	  party	  implements	  a	  reform	  only	  based	  on	  learning	  from	  its	  own	  research	  institutions.	  The	  
consequences	  of	  centralized	  learning	  are	  that	  solutions	  can	  be	  found	  quickly	  and	  effectively.	  
However,	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  that	  the	  proposed	  reforms	  are	  based	  too	  much	  on	  the	  policy	  learning	  
processes	   and	   tools	   that	   are	   related	   to	   a	   single	   political	   actor,	   i.e.	   a	   national	   ministry,	   a	  
political	  party,	  or	  a	  think	  tank	  that	   is	  related	  to	  a	  certain	   interest	  group.	  This	  bears	  the	  risk	  
that	   a	   reform	   can	   be	   implemented	   quickly,	   but	   also	   that	   a	   new	   government	   will	   undo	   a	  
reform,	  simply	  because	  it	  did	  not	  agree	  to	  it.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  policy	  learning	  can	  be	  a	  very	  
pluralized	  process.	  This	  means	  that	  learning	  regarding	  a	  certain	  problem	  can	  happen	  in	  many	  
different	  tools	  and	  processes.	  For	  example,	  policy	  learning	  regarding	  a	  certain	  issue	  can	  occur	  
in	   several	   public	   bodies,	   expert	   councils,	   and	   organizations	   of	   political	   parties	   as	   well	   as	  
independent	   think	   tanks	  at	   the	  same	  time.	  Pluralized	  processes	  of	  policy	   learning	  have	   the	  
advantage	  that	  the	  number	  of	  perspectives	  on	  a	  problem	  is	  widened	  considerably,	  which	  can	  
entail	  a	  more	  profound	  analysis	  and	  problem	  solving	  than	  when	  learning	  is	  very	  centralized.	  
However,	   such	   processes	   of	   policy	   learning	   risk	   to	   result	   into	   a	   cacophony	   of	   different	  
research	  contributions	   that	  do	  not	  allow	   for	  an	  effective	   synthesis.	  Then	   it	   is	   very	  hard	   for	  
decision-­‐makers	  to	  come	  to	  the	  formulation	  of	  a	  coherent	  solution.	  	  
• Recommendation	   1:	   Policy	   learning	   tools	   and	   processes	   should	   keep	   the	   balance	  
between	  centrality	  and	  plurality	  of	  policy	  learning.	  Problem	  solving	  should	  take	  into	  
account	   as	   many	   different	   views	   as	   possible,	   however	   without	   loosing	   sight	   of	   a	  
coherent	  conclusion.	  
	  
2. Stability	  vs.	  discontinuity:	  The	  second	  dimension	  entails	  dyad	  of	  stability	  and	  discontinuity	  of	  
policy	   learning.	   This	   means	   that	   policy	   learning	   processes	   and	   tools	   regarding	   a	   certain	  
problem	   can	   either	   be	   stable	   and	   continuous,	   or	   change	   frequently.	   Both	   elements	   have	  
advantages	   and	   disadvantages	   for	   policy	   learning.	   Stability	   in	   the	   policy	   learning	  
infrastructure	  means	   that,	   regarding	   a	   certain	   problem,	   the	   type	   and	   number	   of	   involved	  
learning	  processes	  and	   tools	  does	  not	   change,	  neither	  does	   the	  hierarchy	  amongst	   them	   if	  
there	  is	  one.	  If	  we	  construct	  an	  example,	  learning	  concerning	  pension	  reforms	  could	  always	  
be	   based	   on	   temporary	   expert	   councils	   only.	   In	   effect,	   stability	   and	   continuity	   of	   policy	  
learning	  infrastructures	  should	  be	  positive	  for	  a	  learning	  process,	  because	  it	  creates	  enough	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time	  for	  doing	  research,	  verify	  findings	  and	  create	  sustainable	  solutions.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
too	   much	   stability	   in	   the	   policy	   learning	   process	   might	   be	   problematic.	   This	   should	   be	  
particularly	  the	  case	  if	  stable	  learning	  processes	  come	  along	  with	  an	  inflexibility	  to	  find	  new	  
solutions.	   For	   example,	   the	   learning	   infrastructure	   suggests	   always	   the	   same	   solution,	  
although	   it	   is	  obvious	   that	   it	   is	  not	   feasible	   to	  solve	  a	  certain	  problem	  sustainably.	  What	   is	  
more,	   they	  may	   only	   update	   the	   same	   data	   series,	  without	   exploring	   alternative	   evidence	  
from	  other	   sources.	   This	   has	   also	   to	   do	  with	   the	   initial	   investment	   of	   effort	   needed	   to	   try	  
something	  new	  in	  terms	  of	  data	  analysis.	  In	  these	  cases,	  it	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  take	  a	  fresh	  
look	   at	   a	   problem,	   but	   it	   does	   not	   happen,	   for	   example	   for	   political	   reasons,	   i.e.	   because	  
political	   interests	   penetrate	   the	   policy-­‐learning	   infrastructure	   too	  much.	   The	   other	   side	   of	  
this	  dyad	  is	  discontinuity	  of	  policy	  learning.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  learning	  processes	  and	  tools,	  
which	  are	  being	  used	  in	  the	  policy	  process,	  change	  frequently.	  An	  example	  for	  this	  is	  if	  with	  
every	  change	  of	  government	  the	  policy-­‐learning	  infrastructure	  changes	  also	  and	  the	  contents	  
of	  policy	  learning	  along	  with	  it.	  This	  can	  be	  highly	  problematic,	  if	  these	  dynamics	  come	  along	  
with	  a	  loss	  of	  prior	  knowledge	  or	  the	  stop	  of	  research	  projects	  that	  are	  currently	  running.	  In	  a	  
worst	   case	   scenario,	   a	   new	   government	   closes	   pilots	   that	   have	   just	   started	   and	   sets	   up	  
different	   ones	   that	   are	   staffed	   by	   researchers	   that	   are	   close	   to	   the	   governing	   party	   and	  
therefore	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  produce	  the	  results	  that	  are	  more	  in	  line	  with	  political	  interests	  
of	   government.	   However,	   at	   times,	   discontinuity	   might	   have	   positive	   effects;	   if	   existing	  
research	   programs,	   for	   example	   those	   run	   by	   the	   administration	   itself,	   do	   not	   yield	  
innovative	  solutions.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  it	  might	  be	  important	  to	  break	  with	  existing	  procedures	  
and	  include	  new	  –	  or	  other	  –	  learning	  tools	  and	  processes.	  
• Recommendation	   2:	   The	   second	   recommendation	   is	   that	   policy	   learning	  processes	  
have	   to	  have	  a	   certain	   stability	   and	   continuity	   that	   goes	  beyond	   the	  usual	  political	  
business	   cycles.	   Otherwise,	   there	   is	   a	   risk	   that	   too	   many	   political	   interests	   are	  
capturing	  innovations	  and	  knowledge	  to	  a	  too	  large	  extent.	  
	  
3. Independence	   vs	   politicization:	   The	   third	   dimension	   on	   which	   the	   functioning	   of	   policy	  
learning	  infrastructures	  varies	  are	  independence	  of	  policy	  learning	  infrastructures,	  tools	  and	  
learning	  processes	  as	  well	  as	  their	  capturing	  by	  political	   interests.	  This	  problem	  has	  already	  
been	  mentioned	   in	  the	  previous	  section,	  where	  we	   introduced	  the	  different	  types	  of	  policy	  
learning	  processes	  and	  tools.	  Independence	  in	  the	  policy	  learning	  infrastructure	  means	  that	  
the	  tools	  that	  are	  being	  used	  to	  generate	  policy-­‐relevant	  knowledge	  without	  the	  influence	  of	  
political	  interests.	  For	  example,	  independent	  knowledge	  production	  entails	  that	  the	  research	  
or	  information	  that	  is	  being	  used	  in	  the	  policy	  formulation	  process	  has	  been	  made	  without	  a	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specific	   political	   agenda	   in	   mind.	   Ideally,	   information	   would	   come	   from	   independent	  
researchers,	  which	  have	  enough	  resources	  to	  do	  their	  work	  without	  being	  constrained	  by	  the	  
state,	   partisan	   or	   special	   interests.	   Reports	   that	   suggests	   solutions	   to	   important	   public	  
problems	   should	   be	   balanced	   and	   focused	   on	   problem	   solving	   rather	   than	   serving	   the	  
interests	  of	   specific	   groups.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  policy	   learning	   tools	   and	  processes	   can	  be	  
highly	   politicized.	   The	   country	   reports	   showed	   that	   governing	   parties	   might	   attempt	   to	  
influence	  policy	  learning	  by	  just	  referring	  to	  research	  that	  has	  been	  produced	  by	  foundations	  
or	   think	   tanks	   that	   are	   close	   to	   their	   own	   positions.	   Such	   practices	   are	   particularly	  
problematic,	   if	   there	   are	   no	   other	   learning	   tools	   that	   balance	   some	  of	   the	   possibly	   biased	  
research.	   Politicization	   is	   even	   more	   problematic,	   if	   independent	   public	   bodies	   or	   expert	  
councils	   are	   politically	   biased,	   such	   as	   a	   national	   statistical	   office,	   or	   a	   temporary	   expert	  
commission.	  However,	  even	   independent	  experts	  can	  be	  politicized	  and	  bias	   their	   research	  
results	   according	   to	   political	   interest,	   such	   as	   it	   happened	   regarding	   tobacco	   smoke	   and	  
global	  warming	  (Oreskes	  and	  Conway,	  2010).	  
• Recommendation	   3:	  Policy	   learning	   tools	   and	   infrastructures	   should	  be	   sufficiently	  
independent	  from	  political	  influence	  or	  bias.	  
	  
4. Effectiveness	  evaluation	  vs.	  vision	  building:	  The	  fourth	  dimension,	  on	  which	  policy	  learning	  
tools	   and	   infrastructures	   vary,	   concerns	   the	   differences	   between	   effectiveness	   evaluation	  
and	   vision	   building.	   Effectiveness	   evaluation	   refers	   to	   the	   evaluations	   of	   public	   policies,	  
which	  aims	  at	   finding	  out	  whether	   the	   implementation	  of	  a	   specific	  policy	   instruments	  has	  
yielded	   the	   desired	   results.	   Such	   practices	   are	   common	   in	   many	   countries.	   What	   usually	  
happens	   is	   that	   after	   a	   reform	   has	   been	   implemented,	   researchers	   assess	   whether	   it	   has	  
been	   effective,	   what	   needs	   to	   be	   adapted	   and	   whether	   programs	   should	   be	   prolonged.	  
Whereas	  such	  practices	  are	  useful,	  they	  do	  not	  necessarily	  result	  into	  the	  development	  of	  a	  
vision,	   based	   on	   the	   assessment	   of	   existing	   instruments.	   Mostly,	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	  
evaluation	  reports,	  which	  are	  however	  not	  well	  connected	  to	  one	  another	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  
they	  provide	  a	  common	  vision	  for	  further	  reforms.	  Vision	  building	  refers	  to	  a	  learning	  process	  
with	  a	  more	   long	  term	  goal	   in	  mind.	  Thereby,	  policy	  makers	  would	  not	  only	  assess	  existing	  
instruments	  in	  a	  retrospective	  manner,	  but	  also	  try	  to	  learn	  prospectively	  in	  a	  more	  general	  
manner.	   For	   example	   to	   create	   a	   handbook	   of	   best	   practices	   from	   various	   kinds	   of	   policy	  
experiences.	  However,	  something	  like	  this	  is	  problematic	  to	  be	  implemented.	  Firstly,	  today’s	  
policy	  making	   is	   highly	   complex	   and	   therefore	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   draw	   lessons	   across	   several	  
policy	   fields.	   What	   is	   more,	   evaluations	   of	   different	   policies	   are	   done	   by	   experts	   from	  
different	  fields,	  which	  have	  often	  a	  hard	  time	  to	  effectively	  communicate	  with	  one	  another.	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Secondly,	  vision-­‐building	  is	  also	  a	  political	  act	  as	  such,	  as	  it	  comes	  along	  with	  prioritizing	  one	  
goal	  over	  another.	  Yet	  modern	  policies	  often	  have	  a	  number	  of	   conflicting	  goals	  and	  aims,	  
which	  need	  to	  be	  balanced	  out	  effectively.	  Yet,	  as	  long	  as	  policymakers	  need	  to	  compete	  for	  
votes	  from	  the	  same	  electorate,	  they	  will	  always	  provide	  different	  visions,	  because	  otherwise	  
they	  cannot	  separate	  their	  positions	  effectively	  from	  the	  ones	  of	  their	  competitors.	  In	  terms	  
of	   policy	   learning,	   political	   competition	   necessarily	   comes	   along	   with	   different	  
interpretations	  of	  the	  same	  research	  and	  the	  politicization	  of	  new	  ideas	  and	  knowledge.	  
• Recommendation	   4:	   Policy	   learning	   tools	   and	   infrastructures	   should	   balance	   out	  
mere	  effectiveness	  evaluation	  and	  vision	  building.	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